Abstract. The motivation for Core Logic is explained. Its system of proof is set out. It is then shown that, although the system has no Cut rule, its relation of deducibility obeys Cut with epistemic gain. §1. The debate over logical reform. There is much dispute over which logic is the right logic-indeed, over whether there could even be such a thing as the right logic, rather than a spectrum of logics variously suited for different applications in different areas. Absolutists about logic regard the use of the definite article as justified; pluralists have their principled doubts. For those who engage in the absolutist debate, those whom we can call the quietists are willing to accept the full canon C of classical logic. Their opponents, whom we can call the reformists-intuitionists and relevantists prominent among themargue that certain rules of classical logic lack validity, and have no right to be in the canon.
§1. The debate over logical reform. There is much dispute over which logic is the right logic-indeed, over whether there could even be such a thing as the right logic, rather than a spectrum of logics variously suited for different applications in different areas.
Absolutists about logic regard the use of the definite article as justified; pluralists have their principled doubts. For those who engage in the absolutist debate, those whom we can call the quietists are willing to accept the full canon C of classical logic. Their opponents, whom we can call the reformists-intuitionists and relevantists prominent among themargue that certain rules of classical logic lack validity, and have no right to be in the canon.
Intuitionists, on the one hand, originally drew inspiration for their critique of classical logic from the requirements of constructivity in mathematical proof. According to the intuitionist's construal of existence, a mathematical existence claim of the form 'there is a natural number n such that F(n)' requires its asserter to be able to provide a justifying instance-a constructively determinable number t for which one can prove (intuitionistically!) that F(t):
F(t) ∃x F(x)
This means that one may not use the 'back-door', or indirect, reasoning that would be available to a classical mathematician, whereby in order to derive the conclusion that there is a natural number n such that F(n), it would be sufficient simply to assume that no natural number has the property F, and then (classically!) derive an absurdity from that assumption: (i) ¬∃x F (x) . . .
⊥ (i) ∃x F(x)
Thus the intuitionists ended up rejecting the rule of Classical Reductio ad Absurdum (CR): (i) ¬ϕ . . .
⊥ (i) ϕ
and all rules equivalent to it, modulo the set of rules that the intuitionist could eventually motivate or justify in a more direct fashion. Among these intuitionistic equivalents of (CR) is the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM):
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ through whose rejection intuitionistic logic is perhaps better known. 1 But even the intuitionists retained the rule Ex Falso Quodlibet (EFQ), also known as the Absurdity Rule:
⊥ ϕ which allows one to infer any conclusion one wishes as soon as one has derived an absurdity. This residual rule within intuitionistic logic I is anathema to relevantists, since it affords an easy proof of the infamous Lewis's First Paradox: A, ¬A B. The proof is
Relevantists refuse to accept Lewis's First Paradox, on the grounds that there need not be any connection in meaning between the sentence A in its premises and its conclusion B.
Relevantists regard such a 'lack of relevance' between the premises and conclusions of certain classically approved rules of inference as compromising their claim to genuine validity. Many relevantists are still otherwise classical in their orientation, in endorsing (as relevantly valid) such inferences as Double Negation Elimination (DNE), another intuitionistic equivalent of CR (and of LEM):
The picture that emerges is this: 2 1 In Tennant (1997), the present author argued for principles governing one's choice of logic that would rule out the Nelson systems of so-called 'constructible falsity' as the right way to accommodate the canons of constructive proof as these are understood by mathematicians. For these systems do not consist of 'separable' rules for the individual logical operators. There are no separately stateable rules governing negation in the Nelson systems. The rules all deal with co-occurrences of negation with each of the other operators. See Nelson (1949) and Almukdad & Nelson (1984) . 2 Note that core logic is a subsystem of intuitionistic logic I, which is a subsystem of classical logic C. Core logic results from undertaking both intuitionist and relevantist reform of C. If one undertakes only relevantist reform of C, then (as argued in Tennant, 1997) , the resulting system is CR (classical relevant logic).
for efficient proof search in computational logic. Tennant (1994) showed that core logic is adequate for intuitionistic mathematics. Tennant (1997) gave a meaning-theoretic argument for the claim that core logic is the correct logic. Finally, Tennant (2012) argues for an important revision-theoretic thesis:
Core logic is the minimal inviolable core of logic without any part of which one would not be able to establish the rationality of belief revision.
Thus the sequence of different kinds of justification for choice of logic terminates in one that underscores the appropriateness of the new name for the system. Our task, in this study, is to set out the system of core logic, and establish a surprising cut-elimination result for it.
We should make clear at the outset that the current approach, while rooted firmly in the proof-theoretic tradition deriving from the works of Gentzen (1934) and Prawitz (1965) , nevertheless involves a significant departure from them. The reader will see that the rules of inference below are cast in a form that in effect marries the sequent approach with that of natural deduction. Nodes within a proof tree are labeled with sentences, as is the case with natural deduction. (In sequent proofs, nodes are labeled less economically with sequents.) But the proof tree itself has the macrostructural economy of a sequent proof. (Natural deductions do not fare well on this score, since they often involve repetitions of whole chunks of proof above multiple occurrences of the same sentence.) The resulting 'hybrid' system of proof-combining the advantages of a sequent system with those of natural deduction-was described in detail in Tennant (1992) .
Another important departure from the former contrast between sequent systems and systems of natural deduction is that in the system presented here, proofs are always in normal form. One is not allowed to use 'cuts' to join together a proof of the conclusion A with another proof in which A occurs as a premise. In the Gentzen and Prawitz systems, one can do this. The cut-elimination theorem for a Gentzen system then tells one that any sequent proof containing such cuts can be transformed into a proof (of the same overall result) that contains no cuts. And the normalization theorem of Prawitz gives one an analogous assurance in the case where the proofs are natural deductions.
In the system of core proof presented here, the operation of 'making a cut' does not produce a new core proof at all. But what we show (by means of Theorem 2.1) is that one can manipulate two core proofs that otherwise could have been 'stuck together' by means of a prohibited cut, so as to obtain the net effect of the core proof that would then have resulted from eliminating that cut. Indeed, the 'net effect' is a pleasing one: in general, one obtains a core proof of some (possibly proper) subsequent of the overall result that the process of cut-elimination on traditional proofs would have vouchsafed.
In the statements of rules that follow, the boxes next to discharge strokes indicate that vacuous discharge is not allowed. There must be an assumption of the indicated form available for discharge. (With (∧-E) and (∀-E) we require only that at least one of the indicated assumptions should have been used, and be available for discharge.) The diamond next to the discharge stroke in the second half of (→-I) indicates that it is not required that Miller and Yaroslav Shramko argue that dual intuitionistic logic is the logic of Popperian science. See Miller (2005) and Shramko (2005) . We can leave to these authors the task of arguing that the logic they favor is the sole logic that is adequate for natural science. As far as we are concerned, we wish only to defend our own proposed logical reforms against the anticipated objection that one might lose some of the logical power that is needed in order to test scientific theories. Provably, one does not. the assumption in question should have been used and be available for discharge. But if it is available, then it is discharged. The rules for identity are stated for the formal record, but will henceforth be omitted from consideration.
Graphic Rules for Core Logic
In core proofs, every major premise for an elimination (MPE) stands proud. So all core proofs are in normal form. This is because no MPE stands as the conclusion of an application of the corresponding Introduction rule. But by having MPEs stand proud, we are also preventing MPEs from standing as the conclusion of an application of any Elimination rule! This raises the question: how can one ensure transitivity of core proof ? Suppose one has core (hence, normal) proofs
where, by virtue of A's being displayed separately, it is to be assumed that A ∈ . In systems of proof allowing accumulation of proof trees, one would be able to form a proof by grafting a copy of onto every undischarged assumption occurrence of A within :
(A) , θ and one would have the assurance that the resulting construction would count as a proof of the overall conclusion θ from the set ∪ of combined assumptions. Finite repetitions of the accumulation operation would also of course be countenanced:
where A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ . This is what is commonly understood as constituting the transitivity of proof (within a system allowing the formation of abnormal proofs).
Why the stress on 'abnormal'? Answer: in the core (hence: normal) proof , the 'cut sentence' A might stand at one of its undischarged assumption occurrences as the major premise of an elimination. In a system of normal proof, the 'proof accumulation' given above of on top of would therefore not always count as a proof (of θ from ∪ ). A fortiori, the 'proof accumulation' just indicated of 1 , . . . , n on top of would not always count as a proof (of θ from 1 ∪ . . . ∪ n ∪ ).
But this apparent absence of unrestricted transitivity (for the system of core, hence normal, proof) imposes no limitation in principle. This perhaps surprising, but very welcome, result is secured by the following theorem. (4)) even if the conclusion of is not an undischarged assumption of .
1.
[A ] = (where A is an undischarged assumption of ). 2.
[ A] = (where A is the conclusion of ).
3. If no assumption-occurrence of A within is the major premise of an elimination, but A is an undischarged assumption of , then It remains only to consider cases where and satisfy the following conditions.
(i) is a non-trivial proof of A (so we are not dealing with case (1) above), (ii) A is an undischarged assumption of (so we are not dealing with case (4) above), and (iii) at least one assumption occurrence of A in is the major premise of an elimination (so we are not dealing with either case (2) or case (3) Soft ripe cases are in turn of two kinds:
(1) the last step of is an introduction; (2) the last step of is an elimination. Hard ripe cases, likewise, are of two kinds:
(i) the last step of is a β-elimination, where β = ¬ ; (ii) the last step of is an α-Introduction.
We now have the following exhaustive and non-overlapping classification of cases. This is important, since we need to deal with every possible case, and need also to deal with each case in a unique way. The dominant operator of the cut sentence A is assumed to be α. We indicate in square brackets the kind of transformation (to be described below) that will apply to the cases in question.
( The operation [ ] distributes across terminal applications of rules of inference in that do not have the cut-sentence A as MPE. (It is assumed, however, that A, which is the conclusion of the proof , is an undischarged assumption of the proof .) The following I-and E-distribution conversions specify how to proceed under these circumstances.
If the proof ends with an introduction (which of course involves no MPE) then we apply the appropriate I-distribution conversion, depending on the dominant operator in the conclusion of . Let us illustrate with the case where the last step of is ∧-Introduction:
The same recipe can encoded graphically as follows:
where the curly parentheses enclosing the final step of ∧-I indicate that the step is not necessary if either
With that explanation, we can rewrite the right-hand side so that the ∧-I distribution conversion reads
without any risk of miscontrual.
If the proof ends with an elimination, whose MPE is not the cut-sentence A, then we apply the appropriate E-distribution conversion. Staying with conjunction for purposes of illustration, we have:
ϕ ,
This can be encoded graphically as follows:
where the curly parentheses indicate that the final step of ∧-E is not necessary if [ ] has neither ϕ nor ψ as an undischarged assumption. With that explanation, we can shorten the right-hand side even further and write
without any risk of misconstrual.
Note how the definition takes into account the possibility that the assumptions-to-bedischarged, namely ϕ and ψ, might both be absent from the resulting set of undischarged assumptions in the transformed proof [ ]. In that case there is no need for a terminal step of ∧-E in the proof on the right. One simply takes the proof [ ] for one's result. Similar remarks hold for ∨-E Distribution, →-E Distribution, ∃-E Distribution, and ∀-E Distribution.
The consideration of epistemic gain applies at every stage of the execution of our effective procedure. If we ever come across a proof of a proper subsequent of the sequent 'to be proved', then we take that proof for our sought result. Otherwise, we build up the sought proof according to the recipe being explained. Our notations below must be read with this point in mind.
The remaining I-and E-distribution conversions for operators other than ∧, using the same graphic abbreviation conventions, are as follows. Remember, it is being assumed that the conclusion A of the proof is not the MPE of the terminal step of the proof immediately to the right of (if that terminal step is an elimination), but is one of its undischarged assumptions.
θ/⊥ (Note that if the minor subproof on the right proves ⊥, then the minor proof is taken for the whole transform.)
θ/⊥ Our distribution conversions above tell one exactly how to compose [ ] in soft ripe cases from (suitable transforms of) subproofs of and of . These conversions handle cases where 1. the final step of is an introduction, or 2. the final step of is an elimination, but does not have the conclusion of (= the cut-sentence A) as its major premise.
We now need to address only the question of how to effect these transformations 
in hard ripe cases, that is, when the cut-sentence A occurs as an undischarged assumption of , and that occurrence is as the major premise of the final step of , which is an elimination.
We proceed by cases, determined by 1. the dominant operator α of A (thereby determining that α-E is the E-rule applied at the final step in );
2. the rule applied at the final step of (which can only be an elimination other than ¬-E, or an application of α-I). 4
There are 36 cases to consider, and they are laid out systematically in the table below. Each entry βα (above the horizontal line) represents the case where the last step of is an application of β-E, and the last step of is an application of α-E with major premise A (which of course leaves open the possibility that A occurs elsewhere as an undischarged assumption of ). Entries of the form αα of course represent steps where the two MPEs involved will not in general be the same. The final row of the table (below the horizontal line) is to be understood as involving cases where the last step of is an application of α-I (as indicated by the subscript I ), and the last step of is an application of α-E.
We shall work our way down each column, from the left to the right, leaving the final row for consideration at the end. All cases above the horizontal line involve what are known as 'permutation conversions'. With a permutation conversion, the basic aim is to get the terminal elimination of to be terminal in the transform [ ]. In the schemata below, the cut-sentence is (or its immediate subsentences are) in roman. The terminal MPE of is in Greek font. This helps the reader to track the effect of the conversion or reduction in question. The starred parameters for ∃-E in the transforms for cases of the form ∃α are to be chosen so as to ensure that the application in question of ∃-E is formally correct. By inspection, this can always be done.
Note that the effect of every permutation conversion below is to reduce the complexity of the proofs and to which the operation [ , ] needs to be applied.
The transformation steps for the cases corresponding to entries below the horizontal line in the table above are known as 'reductions'. The effect of a reduction is to reduce the complexity of the cut-sentence with respect to which execution of the operation [ , ] is still called for.
The list of permutation conversion now follows. Thereafter, we give the list of reductions. We lapse into English only to remark when the one list ends and the other begins.
As with the distribution conversions, the transforms produced by the permutation conversions can be more economical than what is shown in full on the right. This can happen when the transform of a subproof establishes a strong enough result: either it proves ⊥, or it makes do without using any of the assumptions that would otherwise have to be discharged by the terminal elimination lower down.
⊥ Note that if the proof on the right ends with the step of ∀-E indicated, it will be because some, but not necessarily all, of the assumptions ϕ x t 1 , . . . , ϕ x t n remain undischarged within the embedded transform. A similar remark applies to all cases of permutative conversions of the form ∀α.
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θ/⊥ That completes our list of permutation conversions. We turn finally to the reductions [ ], which are called for when the cut-sentence A is the conclusion of an introduction (at the last step in ) and the major premise of the corresponding elimination (at the last step in ).
Assume 
